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t e x t t h a t Carlson overruled Graham v. Sawayay 632 P2d 851 Utah 
(Utah 1981) and replaced i t s "reasonable assurance" standard with 
a ba l anc ing t e s t t h a t weighs the s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t against the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t in an e f f o r t to de te rmine what form of 
process s a t i s f i e s due process . We do not read Carlson tha t way. 
Nowhere in Car l son i s t h e r e language t h a t e x p r e s s l y 
o v e r r u l e s Graham bu t r a t h e r some l a n g u a g e s u g g e s t i n g a 
depor ta t ion from some of the r a t i ona l e and conclusion of Graham. 
C e r t a i n l y as s t a t e d by J u s t i c e Zimmermann in o rder to avoid 
Cons t i tu t iona l in f i rmi ty the requirements of Mullane vs . Hanover 
Bank & Trusty 339 US 306, (1950) can not be circumvented by 
C a r l s o n . We conclude t h a t Car lson s e t s f o r t h a s tandard of 
"d i l i gen t e f fo r t " not u n l i k e t h a t of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e as 
out l ined in 16-10-13(2) UCA. 
"For the foregoing reasons we conclude that a 
Plaintiff proceeding under Section 41-12-8 cannot 
satisfy federal due process requirements by using 
substitute service of process mailed to the last 
known address without having shown that diligent 
efforts have been made to locate the Defendant. 
Only by making a satisfactory showing of diligence 
can such a Plaintiff satisfy the requirements of 
the lien by demonstrating that the form of notice 
chosen is as reasonably calculated to reach the 
Defendant as any other practical alternative." 59 
Utah Advance Reports at 16 [Emphasis added] 
Again we concede substituted service of process is 
appropriate upon a showing of reasonable diligence, but only upon 
a showing of reasonable diligence. As in Carlson, the record 
herein does not reflect any testimony setting forth reasonable 
diligence except on affidavit of Respondent which was rebutted by 
Appellant's counter-affidavit. Appellant was not afforded any 
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other opportunity to overcome Respndent's showing of reasonable 
d i l i g e n c e . 
Respondent a s s e r t s t h a t as per the court below tha t i t 
exercised reasonable d i l igence and went to grea t lengths to t ry 
and e f f e c t pe r sona l s e r v i c e on De fendan t ' s r eg i s t e r ed agent . 
However, the evidence in the record is in the form of Aff idavi ts 
and Counter-Aff idavi ts , not d i r e c t tes t imonia l evidence taken a t 
any evident ia ry hear ing , t r i a l or other forum wherein appel lant 
had the r ight to cross-examine respondent ' s wi tnesses . Such an 
e f f o r t to s u b s t a n t i a t e a showing of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e 
c e r t a i n l y f l i e s in the face of resolving d isputes on the mer i ts 
and the Defendant's r i gh t s to c ross -examine w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t 
him. Respondent's amended a f f idav i t of non-service a l leg ing at 
l e a s t twenty at tempts on Richard Smith and twenty a t t e m p t s on 
Gary Smith without naming any dates or times i s a t best a shoddy 
shotgun approach to e s t ab l i sh reasonable d i l igence and does not 
conform to the standards of Carlson or Graham. 
In reply to respondent ' s Point I I I , we offer the following 
comments: 
P r i n c i p a l l y , respondent r e l i e s on the holding in Meyers 
v s . Interwest Corp. , 632 P 2d 881 (Utah 1981). We d i s t ingu i sh 
Meyer's fac ts from the fac t s of the ins t an t case . In Meyer the 
defendant appealed from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r g r a n t i n g 
P l a i n t i f f ' s motion to amend the summons and denied defendant ' s 
motion to d i s m i s s for lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n . D e f e n d a n t , a 
Colorado e n t i t y was served pursuant to Utah 's longarm s t a t u t e 
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but did not file an answer. Approximately two years after 
service of process, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss stating 
that the summons had stated 20 days to answer the complaint as 
opposed to the statutory 30 days allowed an out-of-state 
defendant. Plaintiff amended its summons after the statute of 
limitations had run. The court held that this was not material 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party stating: 
"The defendant was clearly on notice by means of a summons 
and complaint which were filed prior to the running of the 
statute, that it was being sued and would have to marshall 
its witnesses and evidence. Although the summons may have 
been defective, the defect was unconsequential, and the 
passage of time did not deprive the trial court of the 
power to permit an amendment." Id at 8 81. 
The Meyers case was talking about a defect in the summons 
that if complied with would not have prejudiced defendant's 
rights. In the instant case we are concerned with whether 
reasonable diligence has been met and whether the court abused 
its discretion in allowing respondent to show reasonable 
diligence by such an amended affidavit of nonservice. 
On the facts, the defendant in the Meyers case had full 
knowledge of the pending action against it, but of its own 
volition chose not to answer the complaint, though it had 
approximately two years to do so. In the instant case, appellant 
never knew of the pending action nor was it ever afforded an 
opportunity to answer the complaint or in any way respond to the 
action that had been brought against it. 
Respondent cites Meyers for the principal that material 
prejudice will seldom result. If material prejudice results even 
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once, then it is an abuse of discretion. In the instant case, if 
respondent is allowed to perfect its service of process without a 
showing of reasonable diligence except for its amended affidavit 
of nonservice, then appellants only hope is to seek equity under 
the principals of Rules 60(b)1 and 60(b)7. Clearly to allow such 
an amended affidavit of nonservice materially prejudices the 
substantial rights of appellant. In the alternative, if this 
court holds that it was an abuse of discretion to allow such a 
amended affidavit of nonservice, then at worst, respondent is 
compelled to try its case on the merits. One way appellant 
loses; the other way appellant may lose, but only upon the merits 
of the case. 
In response to Point IV, appellant replies as follows: 
In Point IV of its argument, respondent cites the case of 
Gardiner & Gardiner Builders vs. Swap, 656 P.2d, 429 (Utah 1982) 
in an effort to persuade this court that appellant is not 
entitled to relief under 60(b)l. We distinguish our facts from 
those of Gardiner: 
In Gardiner, defendant Reed Swapp hacEl failed to respond to 
discovery procedures full well knowing of the underlying cause of 
action. As a sanction, the court ordered pleadings of defendant 
to be stricken and enter default judgment against defendant Reed 
Swap. In the instant case, we had no knowledge of the underlying 
cause of action prior to default judgment being entered. 
In Gardiner, defendant Swapp failed to file his motion to 
set aside based on Rule 60(b)(1) URCP within the three month time 
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l i m i t of Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) URCP. In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a p p e l l a n t 
immediately f i l e d motion to s e t a s i d e t he d e f a u l t judgment (well 
w i t h i n the 3 month l i m i t ) pu r suan t among o the r t h i n g s , to Rule 
60(b) (1) and 60(b) (7), 
In addition, the Gardiner court found that the alleged 
negligence or abandonment by defendant's attorney was not 
supported by the record, 
ff[T]he records shows that the failure to communicate may 
have not been entirely the negligence of the attorney, . . 
[S]wapp failed to contact his attorney for one and a half 
years after he filed his answer and counterclaim." 
In the instant case, appellant upon learning of default 
judgment, which constituted the only notice of the action against 
him, caused its attorney to immediately file a motion to set 
aside default judgment. 
Respondent's use of the Gardiner holding adds little 
weight to the proposition that appellant ought to be denied his 
day in court because the trial judge was clearly within the scope 
of his discretion in Gardiner. We assert that the facts in 
Gard iner are substantially different than those of the instant 
case so as to deny that conclusion. 
Respondent cites the case of Stesu, Inc. v. Roger Toole 
Drywall, Inc., 234 S.E. 2nd 102 (GA 1977), as authority for the 
proposition that a defendant failing to claim certified mail is 
cited with having constructive notice of a pending action. 
The Georgia statutes have a statute similar to Utah's that 
allows for substituted service "whenever its registered agent 
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered 
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o f f i c e , " i d . a t 103. In the Stesu case , the court denied the 
motion to se t aside defendant ' s defaul t judgment but s t a t e d : 
"Here the record does not e s t a b l i s h t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d agent could not be found with ( r ea sonab l e 
d i l i g e n c e ) a t the reg is te red o f f i ce . Nevertheless f the 
order of December 29, 1975, r e c i t e s t h a t defendant was 
r e g u l a r l y served with p rocess and t h e r e was %proof of 
service of summons.1 Under these circumstances, although 
the record does not a f f i rmat ive ly reveal fu l l compliance 
with the s t a tu to ry provis ions as to reasonable d i l i gence , 
absent a contrary showing by defendant (an none was made), 
we wi l l presume the r e g u l a r i t y of the proceedings below." 
Id. a t 104 [emphasis added] 
In the i n s t a n t case t h e r e i s adequate evidence on the 
record , pr imari ly the a f f idav i t of Barbara Smith, to dispute and 
r e b u t any a l l e g a t i o n s of r ea sonab le d i l i g e n c e a s s e r t e d in 
respondent ' s amended a f f i d a v i t of n o n s e r v i c e . T h e r e f o r e , we 
d i s t i n g u i s h our c i r cums tances from those of Setsu in tha t we 
object to a showing of reasonable d i l i g e n c e . 
Respondent next r e l i e s on Rifenburg v. Li f f i ton Homes, 
Inc . , 107, A.D. 2d, 1015, 486 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (New York 1985) to 
support the proposi t ion tha t a p p e l l a n t ' s r ece ip t of the not ice of 
c e r t i f i e d l e t t e r in the i n s t an t case should have charged him with 
knowledge of the l e t t e r ' s con ten t s . We do not read Rifenburg 
t ha t way. Rifenburg had a s imilar s i t u a t i o n where the defendant 
had been mailed service of process by c e r t i f i e d mail and as in 
t h i s c a s e , the mail was r e t u r n e d unc la imed. However, t h e 
Rifenburg court focused on a l i t t l e d i f fe ren t set of fac ts than 
the ins tan t case s t a t i n g : 
"Defendant's r igh t to defend a su i t when i t i s shown tha t 
i t Ndid not personal ly receive not ice of the summons in 
t ime to defend ' i s given s t rong p r o t e c t i o n . [Omitting 
cases] . . . The s t a t u t e was not intended, however, to 
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permit a corporate defendant to ignore not ice of c e r t i f i e d 
mail and leave such mail unclaimed a t the post o f f i c e , " 
[Emphasis added] Id a t 531. 
In the ins tan t case defendant did not ignore the not ice of 
c e r t i f i e d mail and leave i t unclaimed a t the post o f f i c e but 
ra ther as soon as i t s agent came home from the weeks cons t ruc t ion 
a c t i v i t i e s immediately made e f for t to go to the post off ice and 
claim the l e t t e r . The fac t s show the conclusion tha t appel lant 
did everything i t could in the in s t an t ac t ion to claim the l e t t e r 
o n l y to f i n d , as s t a t e d , t h a t i t had been r e t u r n e d to the 
Secretary of s t a t e ' s o f f i c e . The b a s i s upon which a p p e l l a n t 
claims excusable neglect is in tha t f a i l u r e to follow up with the 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s o f f i c e to f ind out what t h e l e t t e r 
c o n t a i n e d . But nowhere in the record is there a showing tha t 
appel lant simply ignored the not ice of c e r t i f i e d mai l . 
COHCLDSION 
Due process is a requirement for personal jurisdiction. 
Either you have it or your don't. In the instant case, 
Respondent had the duty to make a showing of reasonable diligence 
as outlined in 16-10-13(2) UCA before it relied on substituted 
service of process. Without a showing of reasonable diligence, 
Respondent has not met the due process requirements under 16-10-
13(2) UCA, Graham, Carlson, or Mullane. While we do not contest 
the constitutional firmity of substituted process if meets 
statutory requirements, we do contest any service of process 
which does not meet the statutory requirement of reasonable 
diligence to establish due process. 
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The only way Respondent can make a showing of reasonable 
diligence is for this court to sustain the amended affidavit of 
nonservice allowed by the court below. We find little comfort in 
the holding relied on by Respondent that "material prejudice 
almost never occurs." It is very clear that the resolution of 
the issue regarding the allowance of the amended affidavit of 
nonservice is at least to some extent, outcome determinative. 
That isf by allowing it, Appellant must then rely on the 
equitable powers of the court to grant relief under rule 60(b)(1) 
or 60(b) (7) URCP whereas to deny it only puts Appellant and 
Respondent back in their respective original positions when this 
law suit was commenced. 
Finally, Appellant did not secret itself, attempt to avoid 
service of process, or intentionally ignore notice of a 
registered letter leaving it unclaimed at the post office as 
alleged herein. Upon learning of the notice of certified mail, 
Appellant's agent quickly responded only to find the mail had 
been returned to the Secretary of State's office. The only thing 
Appellant did not do was follow up on the notice of certified 
mail to find out its contents. Those facts are significantly 
different than any facts relied on by Respondent in its brief. 
We assert such acts on the part of Appellant constitutes 
excusable neglect within the preview of Rule 60(b)(1). 
Therefore, Appellant asks this court to remand this case 
with instructions to set aside default and default judgment and 
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allow Appellant to proceed upon the merits and advance its 
defenses. 
DATED this W> day of September, 1987. 
BAI: ILSON 
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